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THE ISSUE 
Two diametrically opposed visions of the euro-area architecture have been put forward. 
European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker favours a model that puts the Com-
mission at the centre of fiscal policy decision-making. The former German finance minis-
ter Wolfgang Schäuble argues that fiscal surveillance should be centred on a reformed Eu-
ropean Stability Mechanism. Juncker’s proposal would over-emphasise the Commission 
when fiscal policy making is national and would unduly mix the roles of Commission and 
Council. Schäuble, by contrast, neglects the fact that national fiscal policy matters for the 
euro area not only for sustainability reasons but also because of the provisioning of public 
goods, stabilisation policy and effects on inflation and growth. This Policy Brief does not 
discuss the completion of banking union, which is essential for a stable euro area.
POLICY CHALLENGE 
Fiscal policy making in the euro area will remain a difficult balancing act between 
national politics and European interests. Departing from both Juncker’s and Schäuble’s 
proposals, the Eurogroup should be developed into a Eurosystem of fiscal policy (EFP) 
as the centre of euro-area fiscal governance. The Eurogroup should have a permanent, 
full-time president, with a mandate to represent the interests of the whole euro area, and 
who will report regularly to the European Parliament. The Commission would make fiscal 
policy recommendations to member states; fiscal rules would be reformed. Political, 
and in some cases market, pressure would increase on countries that fail to comply with 
recommendations. Ultimate responsibility for debt will remain national. The European 
Stability Mechanism should become a permanent fire brigade to manage sovereign debt 
crises, including possible restructurings in extreme cases. Finally, the EU budget should 
be reformed to focus on European public goods and on a stabilisation function.
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COMPETING VISIONS OF EURO-AREA 
GOVERNANCE: JUNCKER VERSUS 
SCHÄUBLE
European Commission president Jean-
Claude Juncker and Germany’s former 
finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble have 
proposed competing visions of euro-area 
governance. For Juncker, the core of the vi-
sion is a strengthened European Commis-
sion, with a Commission vice president 
who would be the euro-area finance min-
ister, chairing the Eurogroup, presiding 
over a euro-area budget that is part of the 
European budget and giving recommen-
dations to the Eurogroup and the member 
states on their national fiscal policies, 
based on a ‘political’ interpretation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)1.
By contrast, Schäuble’s vision2 is 
clearly motivated by a mistrust of the 
European Commission. Schäuble 
proposes to transform the European 
Stability Mechanism into a permanent 
European Monetary Fund (EMF) – the 
euro area needs a fire brigade even when 
no fire is burning. According to this 
plan, the EMF would have a clear crisis 
prevention mandate comparable but 
more far-reaching than the International 
Monetary Fund’s Article IV. In particular, 
the ESM would “gradually” be put 
in charge of monitoring the SGP3. 
Eventually, the Fiscal Compact and 
ESM Treaty would be changed so the 
ESM would fully monitor euro-area 
compliance with fiscal rules. Schäuble’s 
mistrust of the European Commission is 
expressed in the wording that the ESM 
would play a “stronger, neutral” role.
These visions of the euro-area 
architecture are diametrically opposed 
– and both are flawed. Juncker’s 
proposal ignores the reality of the strong 
intergovernmental nature of European 
fiscal policy coordination, while Schäuble 
disregards the numerous spillovers from 
European fiscal policymaking. 
Juncker’s plan to merge the role 
of the chair of the Eurogroup with 
that of the economic and financial 
affairs commissioner is institutionally 
problematic. In fact, the proposal would 
amount to asking the prosecutor to 
preside as the chief judge over fiscal 
decision making4. The European Union 
is built on a fine balance between 
community interests and national 
interests. At its core, this gives the 
European Commission primacy in 
initiating legislation and in issuing 
recommendations in the context of the 
SGP, while giving member countries 
supremacy in taking final decisions on 
the SGP, and giving the Council of the 
European Union and the European 
Parliament the final say on legislation5. 
A merging of the roles of chair of the 
council and commissioner would upset 
this fine balance. 
It would also lead to conflicts of 
interest. How could the European 
Commissioner/finance minister issue a 
recommendation based on the EU legal 
framework, and then risk losing her/
his authority as the chairperson of the 
council that might want to take a political 
decision to reject the recommendation6? 
The European Commission already 
has an impossibly difficult task to 
interpret a set of rather incomprehensible 
fiscal rules. But the political approach 
taken to SGP recommendations has 
undermined trust in the European 
Commission as an independent guardian 
of the treaty and has disturbed the 
delicate EU balance described above7. 
Flexibility in fiscal rules is useful but 
needs to be deployed in a broad forum 
with strong support from the member 
states, and should be applied even-
handedly. Juncker’s European finance 
minister proposal is also inefficient 
because it would give the position of 
chair of the Eurogroup to the European 
Commission, disregarding the fact that 
fiscal policy is national and legitimacy 
for national fiscal policy derives 
from national parliaments. Having 
a commissioner, whose legitimacy 
is based on European processes, as 
chair of the group of national finance 
ministers would not provide adequate 
political legitimacy and the efficiency 
of the group would suffer as national 
ownership would decline. Having said 
this, it is true that Eurogroup decisions 
should be made more transparent.
Schäuble’s intergovernmental vision 
also has major shortcomings, and 
some parts of his proposal, such as 
1. Juncker outlined his 
vision in his 13 September 
2017 State of the Union 
address to the European 
Parliament. See http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_SPEECH-17-3165_
en.htm. 
2. In an undated non-paper 
from the German federal 
finance ministry, published 
in October 2017; see 
https://www.scribd.com/
document/361120275/
German-finance-minis-
try-non-paper-on-Euro-
zone-reforms.
3. Though the Schäuble paper 
is silent on what this would 
mean for countries outside 
the euro area, which are 
also currently subject to the 
SGP. 
4.   It is comparable to 
appointing Wolfgang 
Schäuble president of the 
Bundestag while keeping 
his finance minister 
position.
5.   As was aptly described by 
Italy’s former prime min-
ister Giuliano Amato at an 
October 2017 conference; 
see https://www.eu2017.
ee/political-meetings/ac-
ademic-conference (min-
utes 26ff; Amato, 2017).
6.   Some have made a 
comparison with the high 
representative for foreign 
affairs, who is also the vice 
president of the European 
Commission, but the high 
representative position 
is in fact a double-hat 
position and not a role in 
which only a commissioner 
acquires the chairmanship 
of the Eurogroup. Also 
substantively, the EU’s 
Common Foreign and 
Security Policy does not 
foresee a clear institutional 
separation between the 
issuing of recommenda-
tions based on a clear legal 
framework and decisions 
that need to be taken in 
the council based on such 
recommendations.
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automatic restructuring, would be highly 
problematic.
According to Schäuble, the ESM 
should remain an intergovernmental 
institution (at least if there is no will 
to change the treaties). Nevertheless, 
the proposal is worrying institutionally 
because it would unsettle the delicate 
balance between interests of the 
euro area as a whole and national 
interests. In particular, the ESM as an 
intergovernmental institution cannot 
make ‘neutral’ recommendations – on 
the contrary, it is a highly political 
institution. As its decision-making 
process is based on unanimity among its 
Board of Governors, it would essentially 
have to fully internalise the political 
process when issuing fiscal policy 
recommendations. In doing so, the 
role of the neutral interpreter – ie the 
prosecutor – and the judge would again 
be blurred.
The proposal would deprive the 
Commission of its role as the institution 
in charge of applying the fiscal rules (at 
least for the euro-area countries). The 
important separation between political 
interpretation and neutral application of 
the rules would be lost.
The ESM itself also has interests that 
might not be in line with the interests of 
the euro area as a whole. In particular, 
it could take an excessively risk-averse 
approach to fiscal deficits, neglecting 
the positive economic effects that good 
stabilisation policy can deliver, while 
focussing excessively on sustainability 
concerns, which are the primary interest 
of the ESM. 
The proposal would therefore 
deprive the Eurogroup of the important 
representation of euro-area-wide 
interests in its decision making. Beyond 
ensuring that national fiscal policy 
remains sustainable, community 
interests would be little represented. 
However, it is well known and well 
established that there are numerous 
spillovers and interactions between 
national fiscal policies, monetary policy, 
inflation and euro-area growth.
It is indispensable that euro-area 
interests should be strongly represented 
in the Eurogroup. That is not visible in 
the Schäuble paper beyond emergency 
lending and strengthening of banking 
union. 
TOWARDS A MORE EFFECTIVE 
INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP: A 
‘EUROSYSTEM OF FISCAL POLICY’8
Neither Juncker’s nor Schäuble’s visions 
would deliver effective decision mak-
ing. But they are right to highlight that 
the current set-up suffers from draw-
backs and should therefore be changed. 
Currently, fiscal coordination primarily 
focuses on sustainability or more specif-
ically the avoidance of excessive deficits. 
But two important aspects are not suffi-
ciently considered in the current system: 
(1) The framework for management of 
sovereign debt crisis, including possible 
debt restructurings in extreme cases, is 
weak and (2) the representation of com-
mon interests in decision-making is weak 
while fiscal rules do not sufficiently take 
care of stabilisation policy, in particular 
in terms of the area-wide fiscal stance. 
National fiscal policies matter for the 
union beyond sustainability concerns: 
in particular, the area-wide fiscal 
stance and its impact on inflation, and 
spillovers of national policies across 
borders, are relevant channels that 
need to be considered9. In the absence 
of a large central/federal treasury, it is 
indispensable to have a forum in which 
national policies can be discussed 
and, ideally, adapted if necessary. 
Coordination of fiscal policies will remain 
important in Europe’s monetary union 
unless a giant leap towards a federation 
with central fiscal powers is made. Since 
national fiscal policy is driven by national 
policymakers, a forum needs to exist 
where these national politics can be 
reconciled.
Of course, one could hope to create 
a system in which national fiscal policy 
is exercised fully independently and a 
hard no-bail-out clause prevents moral 
hazard. However, such a system is only 
credible with significant European-level 
policies (in particular banking union) 
and only efficient with European-level 
stabilisation policy. The latter seems 
unlikely to be available anytime soon while 
the former is being built-up. Coordination 
7. Representatives of smaller 
countries have voiced con-
cerns that they cannot rely 
on the Commission to take 
an even-handed approach 
between smaller and larger 
member states. This can 
have negative effects well 
beyond the application of 
the SGP. How can the Com-
mission ask member states 
to respect the rule of law 
when it itself appears ready 
to interpret the SGP rules 
differently for different 
countries?
8.   The paper does not discuss 
the completion of banking 
union, which is essential 
for a stable euro area, nor 
next steps on capital mar-
kets union.
9.  For a recent paper see 
Farhi and Werning (2017).
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10.  For the last months of his 
mandate, Jeroen Dijsel-
bloom has become such a 
full-time Eurogroup chair.
11. As Eurogroup insiders 
know, one of the reasons 
why Eurogroup meetings 
are now less less likely to 
last into the night is that 
more preparatory work is 
done by the current Euro-
group president.
policies will therefore remain important 
for stabilisation. When banking union 
is completed and financial policies are 
truly European, the no-bail-out clause 
will become more credible. That also 
means that fiscal rules can become less 
intrusive. At the same time, to achieve 
better stabilisation policy, the rules should 
become more binding politically as the 
following sections explain.
STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF THE EUROGROUP 
PRESIDENT BY MAKING IT A FULL-TIME 
POSITION AND IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY
An obvious starting point to better 
represent euro-area interests is to 
transform the president of the Eurogroup 
into a permanent, full time position10. 
It is sometimes argued that chairing 
the Eurogroup is not a full-time job, 
but this view seems to disregard the 
complexity of the task. Key decisions need 
to be prepared through many bilateral 
discussions between key stakeholders 
before the meeting11. Moreover, a full-
time president should also increasingly 
represent the euro area’s interests. For 
example, the Eurogroup president could 
regularly visit national parliaments and 
give press conferences in Brussels and in 
the national contexts to explain Eurogroup 
decisions. In fact, it is very important to 
make the European voice heard in the 
national decision-making bodies so that 
collective decisions do not only rely on the 
national finance minister in the national 
contexts. A further advantage of a full-
time position is that conflicting interests 
between the national and the European 
mandate would disappear.
To underpin a neutral president who 
chairs and represents the euro-area 
interest while simultaneously being 
fully accepted by national ministers, 
a dual appointment process would 
be desirable. The appointment could 
be based on a qualified majority vote 
in the Eurogroup followed by a (non-
binding) confirmation vote in the 
European Parliament (possibly in 
euro-area composition). An important 
legal question would be whether the 
Eurogroup, which is currently officially 
still an informal body according to the 
Treaties, would need a different formal 
status if the European Parliament were to 
play a role in the appointment process. 
To increase transparency around 
decisions taken, the Eurogroup president 
would have to regularly report to the 
European Parliament, perhaps back-
to-back with the appearance of the 
European Central Bank president. 
However, the European Parliament 
should not have the right to dismiss the 
Eurogroup president; that right would 
remain with the Eurogroup to reflect the 
fact that the ultimate ‘judges’ on national 
fiscal policies remain in the council. 
After all, national fiscal policies are not 
decided in the European Parliament. 
A further step towards increasing the 
common interest in the decision making 
on national fiscal policies would be to 
give the president of the Eurogroup a 
certain voting weight in formal Economic 
and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) 
decision making. Of course, to merge the 
role of the Eurogroup president with the 
ECOFIN chair or to give voting weight 
would require a treaty change.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE 
FISCAL RULES
The Commission should continue to be 
in charge of fiscal surveillance and give 
neutral recommendations to the Euro-
group. However, fiscal rules are in urgent 
need of reform. They are overly complex, 
opaque and often provide faulty recom-
mendations in real time. Moreover, Eu-
ropean fiscal rules do not give sufficient 
weight to the stabilisation policies need-
ed for the monetary union as a whole. 
In addition, while rules such as the 
Fiscal Compact put significant weight on 
debt reduction, in their application the 
debt reduction is not achieved. Too many 
loopholes and unclear interpretations 
prevent transparent and clear decision 
making that makes economic and 
political sense.
Instead, a simple ‘Taylor rule’ for 
deficits should be put in place to provide 
transparent guidance to national 
policymakers: Deficits should be higher as 
the output gap increases (and conversely). 
Deficits should be lower, the larger the 
debt level is compared to the 60 percent 
SGP benchmark. The weights attached 
President of the 
Eurogroup should 
be a permanent, full 
time position; it has 
been argued that it 
is not a full-time job, 
but this view seems 
to disregard the 
complexity of the 
task
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to stabilisation and debt would need to 
be agreed and fixed. Finally, to prevent 
liquidity traps when the nominal interest 
rate is close to zero, all countries should 
run higher deficits than what the Taylor 
rule suggests. An alternative proposal 
worthwhile considering is an expenditure 
rule, see for example Claeys et al (2016).
A simple rule can be translated 
into a simple formula and would lead 
to greater transparency and even-
handedness in fiscal recommendations. 
It would lead to sensible 
recommendations that take account of 
each country’s sustainability concerns, 
stabilisation needs and the need to 
support monetary policy when it is at 
the zero lower bound. 
The Commission would compute the 
deficit suggested by the rule and make 
a recommendation to the Eurogroup on 
how much of the gap between the actual 
deficit and the one given by the simple 
formula should be closed by the next 
year’s budget.
The Eurogroup, in turn, would 
make a political assessment 
based on the neutral Commission 
numbers. In particular, it would give 
a recommendation on the fiscal 
adjustment member states should 
undertake. If countries do not comply 
with the recommendation, politically 
pressure would gradually build-up. 
In particular, it would be the role of 
the permanent chair to explain in the 
national context why a decision was 
taken. Decisions would thus become 
increasingly binding on national 
policymaking by an intensification of 
political pressure on the country. In 
extremis, access to ESM lending could 
be withdrawn by the Eurogroup by a 
supermajority vote, adding market 
pressure on top of political pressure.
The European Commission would 
thus become a less political body than 
currently, and would interpret a simple 
set of rules in a transparent way. It would 
be for the Eurogroup as the political 
judge to decide on deviations from the 
simple rule. Transparency about why 
deviations from the rule were allowed 
would be significantly improved through 
the appearances of the Eurogroup chair 
before the European Parliament. 
WHAT ABOUT THE ESM?
The ESM is of vital importance for the euro 
area’s stability. It is therefore important 
to think about how to strengthen it 
institutionally and how to embed it in the 
euro-area governance framework proposed 
here.
The ESM manages sovereign debt 
crises and prevents self-fulfilling crisis in 
sovereign debt markets together with the 
ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions 
programme (OMT)12. An automatic 
restructuring clause that forces debt 
restructuring in all circumstances in 
which the ESM is employed would 
destroy this important feature that is 
of vital importance for the euro area. 
In fact, the existence of the ESM/OMT 
programme is an essential substitute for a 
euro-area safe asset because it solves the 
problem of self-fulfilling debt crises. 
Without a strong ESM/OMT 
programme, the euro area would need to 
create a treasury to issue a common debt 
in order to be sustainable. However, such 
a step would require a huge leap forward 
in terms of political and institutional 
convergence, which the euro area will 
not be able to make at this stage. More 
technical solutions such as European 
Safe Bonds (ESBies)13 may be desirable 
but do not seem to convince either 
market participants or policymakers. 
Therefore the ESM/OMT programme 
needs to be made permanent. The most 
important feature of the ESM/OMT 
programme is a political agreement on the 
sustainability of debt, permitting to the 
ECB to play fully its lender-of-last-resort 
function. One important step to make the 
ESM/OMT programme more credible for 
the markets, and legally sounder, would 
be to accept that the ESM should take 
losses first in case debt turns out to be 
unsustainable ex-post14. This would be a 
significant step in the direction of creating 
a fiscal union for the euro area.
Managing a sovereign debt crisis is 
about managing the distribution of the 
adjustment burden – a highly political 
issue that in the euro area involves 
national and European decision makers. 
Once the multiple equilibria problem is 
12. Claeys (2017) empha-
sises that the reformed 
ESM should also have 
mechanisms to deal with 
pure multiple equilibria/
liquidity problems without 
any need to resort to condi-
tionality.
13. The main justification for 
the ESBies in Brunnermei-
er et al (2016) is exactly 
the problem of multiple 
equilibria in sovereign 
bond markets.
14. For a detailed discussion, 
see Wolff (2014).
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solved, with the ECB being the lender of 
last resort, states cannot go bust unless 
they choose to do so. Unlike companies, 
they have – even when they are in great 
difficulties – revenues (ie tax resources) 
that vastly exceed their interest payment 
obligations. Moreover, many potential 
tax resources remain unexploited, for 
example taxes on wealth15. Nevertheless, 
debt restructuring might be necessary 
in certain circumstances if debt is 
assessed to be unsustainable, ie if raising 
new taxes or cutting spending would 
lead to a highly negative situation for 
the country concerned. One option 
that could be explored would be more 
equity-like instruments such as GDP-
linked bonds. They could provide some 
desirable automatic adjustment capacity 
while also increasing market discipline 
on the margin. However, there are also 
important questions as to whether such 
a small market is liquid and whether it 
would create negative spill-overs on the 
main stock of debt making it thereby an 
undesirable instrument.
The main point here is that sovereign 
debt crises will always be highly 
political. The question then is who 
should decide on the distribution of 
the adjustment burden. In a monetary 
union, this decision cannot be taken 
by national decision makers alone, 
nor can it be taken centrally. Instead 
responsibility for the decision will be 
and should be with the ESM and the 
euro-area ministers. The question is 
what institutional rules should apply to 
the decision making.
Sapir and Schoenmaker (2017) 
suggest making the ESM16 a permanent 
institution in charge of crisis 
management (for governments and as 
a backstop to banking union). They also 
suggest changing its voting mechanism 
allowing for supermajority voting17 – a 
wise proposal. Moving to supermajority 
voting (eg an 85 percent threshold) 
would be an important step to increase 
the reliability of the ESM as a crisis-
management instrument. 
But one could go further in increasing 
transparency and strengthening the 
European interest in such decisions. 
In particular, the appointment of the 
managing director of the ESM could be 
confirmed by the European Parliament, 
following the appointment by the 
Eurogroup ministers. The managing 
director would regularly testify to the 
parliament. And while she would not 
have voting rights in the Eurogroup, her 
role could be strengthened by giving 
her the right to initiate discussions 
on assistance programmes based 
on an independent analysis of ESM 
staff. Unnecessary delays in financial 
assistance programmes caused by 
national procrastination could thereby 
be prevented. The ESM would have the 
obligation to clearly describe alternative 
options to the Eurogroup, and it would 
execute decisions taken by the Eurogroup 
under the political leadership of the 
permanent Eurogroup chair. Finally, 
it would be in charge of defining and 
overseeing conditionality. 
WHAT ABOUT A EUROPEAN FINANCE 
MINISTER?
French president Emmanuel Macron’s 
proposal for a European finance minister 
is, so far, not concrete19. Juncker’s idea 
to call its vice president the ‘European 
finance minister’ and give her a ‘line’ in 
the EU budget might be too small to war-
rant that title. A finance minister should 
be in charge of a substantial budget with, 
ideally, taxation and spending powers and 
the capacity to borrow. For the euro area, 
this would require treaty changes and a 
huge step forward in terms of political 
convergence. It is therefore probably only 
a long-term vision.
It makes sense to develop the EU 
budget further. The Commission’s idea 
to create the euro-area budget as part 
of the EU budget is sensible. First, it 
would avoid creating new institutions 
that would drive a political wedge 
between euro-area and non-euro area 
countries19. Second, serious reform of 
the EU budget is in any case needed. 
President Macron’s Sorbonne speech 
(Macron, 2017) identifies good priorities 
for joint action with true European 
value-added, which would also have the 
support of many citizens in Europe. In 
particular, the costs of border control 
and joint investments in climate change 
15. Aussilloux et al (2017) 
usefully remind us that 
many tax resources such as 
property taxation remain 
unexploited in European 
societies in a context in 
which public debt has often 
increased substantially 
while private wealth has 
equally surged.
16. Whether or not to rename 
the institution the EMF is 
of secondary importance. 
Most important is to make 
it a permanent institution 
and to expand its functions 
so it can serve as a back-
stop to banking union. One 
possible legal avenue could 
be Article 352 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the 
EU. At the time of writing, 
European Commission 
proposals on the ESM are 
due.
17. The German constitutional 
court, however, does not 
allow a supermajority vote 
where Germany could be 
outvoted as this would vio-
late German constitutional 
requirements, see Calliess 
(2012).
18. See, for example Macron’s 
speech at the Sorbonne 
on 26 September 2017 
(Macron, 2017).
19. Still, non-euro area coun-
tries should not be liable 
to pay into the euro-area 
budget line of the EU 
budget.
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20. For example, it could 
amount to €32bn over two 
years for a country the size 
of Italy.
21. In a simulation exercise, 
Claeys et al (2017), show 
that a system built around 
a European unemployment 
insurance scheme for 
large shocks would have 
required net payments 
of some €50 billion in 
2009, when the shock was 
greatest.
22. The more the budget lines 
of the EU budget become 
contingent, the more 
flexibility and the greater 
the budget with which one 
could arrange payments 
to countries and regions 
in need.
mitigation could be increasingly financed 
by the EU budget. The EU budget could 
also increasingly fund European-level 
research, joint universities, exchange 
programmes and collaboration in 
defence and security. Structural funds 
should continue to support convergence, 
but in particular in regions in significant 
need when the national level faces strong 
budget limitations on the support it 
can provide. A reform of the European 
common agricultural policy could free up 
significant resources , but some increases 
in contributions may be necessary the 
more one wants to truly take care of 
European public goods.
A reform of the EU budget would also 
permit the creation of a stabilisation 
instrument. While such an instrument 
would not replace national stabilisation 
policies, it would support countries with 
relatively little fiscal space. One option 
would be to use part of the seven year EU 
budget framework as a fund that could 
be deployed in countries faced with a 
shock. For example, a fund amounting to 
€50-70 billion would enable significant 
support to be provided to a specific 
country if it was strongly affected by an 
asymmetric shock. The support could 
amount to 1-2 percent of GDP of the 
country concerned20.  As recessions 
happen on average every seven years, 
such a provision, amounting to about 10 
to 15 percent of the EU budget, would 
be a helpful instrument. However, it 
should be clear that such a fund would 
not play a significant role in area-wide 
macroeconomic stabilisation policy. It 
would be insurance to support specific 
countries hit by severe shocks. 
It would be important to define the 
conditions under which such support 
payments would be made. The idea of 
creating a catastrophic unemployment 
reinsurance scheme has the advantage of 
enabling automatic payments based on a 
clear indicator. However, it raises serious 
political concerns that the countries 
that would most need support are those 
that have failed to reform their labour 
markets21. An alternative would be to have 
an instrument linked to clear conditions in 
terms of structural reform. A third option 
would be to link it to an objective trigger, 
such as a large fall in GDP. 
Such insurance is more important for 
weaker than for stronger countries. Strong 
countries are more able to borrow and 
insure themselves in the markets than 
weaker countries that are more at risk of 
losing market access while still engaging 
in sensible macroeconomic stabilisation 
policy. As desirable as insurance is for the 
functioning of a monetary union, it is this 
asymmetry that makes the introduction of 
insurance in the euro area so difficult.
Politically, it might therefore be easier 
not to differentiate between a fund for 
stabilisation policy and spending for 
European public goods. One could, 
for example, create more contingent 
budget lines that would allow spending 
more in specific countries when they 
are hit by shocks, such as an increase in 
immigration22. 
One significant step further towards 
creating meaningful EU-level fiscal 
capacity would be to introduce an EU 
tax to fund the EU budget and create a 
borrowing capacity in the EU budget. For 
example, if one based the EU budget on 
a rather volatile tax, such as a corporate 
tax, then the EU budget itself would 
become a stabilising factor. One could 
also consider a carbon tax, which could 
be raised already under the current EU 
treaties. This would be a step towards 
a true centralisation of stabilisation 
policy funded with own resources and 
combined with a borrowing capacity.  
Such a ‘federalisation’ of stabilisation 
policy would improve the working of the 
euro area but it is politically, legally and 
institutionally difficult to do.
The EU budget commissioner 
manages meaningful resources and a 
reorientation of the EU budget could 
provide meaningful insurance that would 
be helpful in specific circumstances. This 
budget commissioner would not stand 
above national ministers in that she would 
not have the resources to replace national 
borrowing or national spending. National 
fiscal policies will remain the core of 
fiscal policies in the euro area. The budget 
commissioner would also not have the 
power to overrule national decisions, a 
political power that would remain with the 
Eurogroup. This is why she would not be a 
A reform of the EU 
budget would also 
permit the creation 
of a stabilisation 
instrument; 
this would not 
replace national 
stabilisation policies 
but would support 
countries with 
relatively little fiscal 
space
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euro area finance minister. Yet, she should 
participate in the Eurogroup.
This institutional set-up could be 
called a ‘Eurosystem of fiscal policy’23. It 
would be a Eurogroup with significant 
modifications to strengthen the euro-
area-wide interest. At the top would 
be a powerful Eurogroup chair, who 
would also be the voice representing 
the euro-area interests in national and 
international forums. She would not be 
a national minster and ideally would 
have voting rights. The Commissioner 
for economic and financial affairs and 
the ESM managing directors would be 
participants without voting rights. As 
today, the Commission would have the 
right of initiative and the obligation to 
make recommendations on fiscal policy. 
In addition, the ESM managing director 
would be given the right to initiate 
discussions on ESM programmes. If 
the euro area were to decide to create 
additional fiscal capacities, the EU budget 
commissioner would be an additional 
member of the group. In the long term, 
the positions of budget commissioner and 
ESM managing director could be merged, 
especially if the ESM became a full EU 
institution and the resources of the ESM 
became true European resources.
Institutional set-up and governance 
matter. In this proposal, the Eurogroup 
would be transformed into a Eurosystem 
of fiscal policy and remain at the centre 
of joint fiscal policy decision-making 
in the euro area. The proposal here 
outlined would not remove the tensions 
between national and euro-area wide 
interests in fiscal decision making. 
These are inherent to the decentralised 
organisation of fiscal policies in the 
euro area. Yet, the proposal would help 
manage these tensions and strengthen 
in the debate the voice of the centre with 
the creation of permanent positions, 
new rights of initiative (and possibly 
votes) and greater accountability to the 
European Parliament. The Eurosystem 
of fiscal policy would thus be the centre 
of coordination where difficult trade-
offs between national and European 
interests are negotiated and coordinated. 
Reformed fiscal rules would provide 
transparent guidance focussing not only 
on sustainability but also area-wide 
stabilisation. The EU budget would 
become more useful for providing public 
goods and supporting stabilisation. 
Nevertheless, fiscal policymaking will 
remain a delicate political balancing 
act, which is unavoidable unless Europe 
decides to become a federation. 
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23. See Sapir and Wolff (2015) 
for an earlier discussion 
with a somewhat different 
set-up.
REFERENCES
Amato, Giuliano (2017) Keynote speech to the Estonian Presidency conference ‘Nation States or Member States? 
Reimagining the European Union’, Tallinn, 9 October, available at https://www.eu2017.ee/political-meetings/academic-
conference 
Aussilloux, V., C. Gouardo, F. Lenglart, M. Cases (2017) 'Dealing with legacy debt in the euro area', Note d'analyse 62, France 
Stratégie
Brunnermeier, M.K., L. Garicano, P.R. Lane, M. Pagano, R. Reis, T. Santos, D. Thesmar, S. Van Nieuwerburgh and D. Vayanos 
(2016) ‘The Sovereign-Bank Diabolic Loop and ESBies’, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 106(5): 508-
512
Calliess, C. (2012) Kein Geld ohne Parlament: ESM, Budgetverantwortung und Bundesverfassungsgericht, Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, available at https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Presse/imported/downloads/xcms_bst_
dms_36409_36410_2.pdf
Claeys, G. (2017) ‘The missing pieces of the euro architecture’, Policy Contribution 2017/28, Bruegel
Claeys, G., Z. Darvas and A. Leandro (2016) ‘A proposal to revive the European fiscal framework’, Policy Contribution 2016/07, 
Bruegel
Claeys, G., Z. Darvas and G. Wolff (2014) ‘Benefits and drawbacks of European unemployment insurance’, Policy Brief 
2014/06, Bruegel
Farhi, E. and I. Werning (2017) ‘Fiscal Unions’, available at https://scholar.harvard.edu/farhi/publications/fiscal-unions, 
forthcoming in the American Economic Review 
Macron, E. (2017) ‘Initiative pour l’Europe – Une Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique’, speech at the Sorbonne, Paris, 
26 September, available at http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel-
macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique/
Sapir, A. and D. Schoenmaker (2017) ‘The time is right for a European Monetary Fund’, Policy Brief 2017/04, Bruegel
Sapir, A. and G. Wolff (2015) ‘Euro-area governance: what to reform and how to do it’, Policy Brief 2015/01, Bruegel
Wolff, G. (2014) ‘The OMT programme was justified but the fiscal union question remains’, Bruegel Blog, 15 October, available 
at http://bruegel.org/2014/10/the-omt-programme-was-justified-but-the-fiscal-union-question-remains/
